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CRIME, DESIRE AND LAW’S 
UNCONSCIOUS: LAW, LITERATURE AND 
CULTURE, by David Gurnham1
GREIG HENDERSON*
IN CRIME, DESIRE AND LAW’S UNCONSCIOUS, David Gurnham deploys a Freudian 
model to explore the relationship between narrative and truth in legal judgments 
concerning sex, desire, and crime. Even though he acknowledges that “a factual 
enquiry after the event is itself a matter of narrative construction in the light 
of value judgments, and thus not at all simply ‘factual,’”2 it is not always clear 
whether the model deployed is meant to be heuristic or ontological. He says 
that psychoanalytical ideas are used “without any claim that [they] represent 
matters of scientific fact or … a priori truth”3 and that “[r]eading law, literature 
and culture ‘psychoanalytically’ need not be a matter of imposing prefabricated 
structures of meaning, but of locating metaphors that offer alternative narratives 
and explanations.”4 Despite these disclaimers, Gurnham reads judgments 
thematically and sees them as incorporating foundational concepts derived from 
Freud. To explain these concepts, he takes what he admits is “the thoroughly 
1. (New York: Routledge, 2014) 148 pages [Gurnham, Crime, Desire and Law’s Unconscious].
2. Gurnham, Crime, Desire and Law’s Unconscious, supra note 1 at 2.
3. Ibid at 35.
4. Ibid at 37.
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*  Professor of English at the University of Toronto and author, most recently, of Creating Legal 
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unfashionable step of including a theory section.”5 The issue, however, is not one 
of fashion; it is one of efficiency. More than a third of this short, 125-page book is 
devoted to introducing terminology and themes. By the time we get to the main 
text, all of the arguments have already been made, and their amplification cannot 
dispel a lingering sense of déjà vu.  
One of the recurring themes is consent, particularly in sexual assault cases. 
A number of questions arise: In cases of erotic asphyxiation where sadomasochism 
(“s/m”) partners have consented to being rendered unconscious, do they also 
consent to whatever happens in the moments of unknowingness that follow? Or 
does consent have to be contemporaneous, ongoing, and conscious? In cases where 
a woman has been subjected to domestic violence in the past, is her supposed 
consent to s/m practices meaningful? Is what appears to be kinkiness merely a 
cover for sexual assault? Following Ummni Khan in Vicarious Kinks: S/M in the 
Socio-Legal Imaginary,6 Gurnham challenges carceral feminism, a “governance 
feminism” that allies itself “with a criminalizing state that purports to address 
systemic and social problems through punishment—with incarceration being 
its main tool.”7 Such feminism “seeks to establish that many sexual practices in 
which men harm or objectify women can be seen to in fact be acts of domestic 
abuse when viewed within the context of ‘social conditions that make sexual 
violence a weapon of choice in the oppression of women.’”8 Gurnham demurs:  
The solidification of such character types as the “male abuser” and the “battered 
woman” means that a discussion of the “facts” of a case will become confused 
with—and sometimes unwittingly replaced by—the a priori assumptions made in 
interpreting them. It must surely be right to say that consent can make little sense 
unless one understands contextual factors that may constrict opportunities for girls 
and women to exercise sexual autonomy in any given situation.9
This is contentious territory, but the issue of consent and sexual autonomy 
is indeed complicated by pre-existing stereotypes and seems to be an issue that 
might repay psychoanalytical intervention. “As is well known,” Gurnham writes, 
“Freud claimed to have discovered a way of making known the unconscious 
influences that are repressed and kept away from consciousness because they 
are fundamentally unacceptable to our mature and civilised sensibilities.”10 This 
5. Ibid at 5.
6. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
7. Gurnham, Crime, Desire and Law’s Unconscious, supra note 1 at 2.
8. Ibid at 2-3.
9. Ibid at 3.
10. Ibid at 4.
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well-known claim is at the core of Gurnham’s attempt to show how “Freud’s 
continued significance is to be found in the way that the narratives he finds in his 
patients link with concerns and anxieties about sex, desire and crime in our own 
age and culture.”11 The object is to “bring law’s unconscious to light.”12
Gurnham’s Freud is “Freud the incredible storyteller,”13 and the first part of 
his study is devoted to theory and method in Freudian literary jurisprudence. To 
include a theory section is not only to incur inefficiency, as I have said, but also 
to rehearse concepts that are already part of our cultural imaginary—concepts 
that should have been interpolated into the chapters to which they pertain. The 
Freudian topography of mind and the depth model that goes with it are familiar, 
even to those whom have never read a word of Freud. Does anyone likely to 
be reading this book really need to be told about the Oedipus complex, the 
primal horde, the primal scene of parental copulation, and other foundational 
psychoanalytic concepts? Moreover, certain concepts are not precisely explicated. 
For example, Gurnham argues that 
reading a legal or a literary text psychoanalytically means paying attention to the 
substitutive and displacing effects of metaphor, and clues that the substitution of 
literal for metaphoric meaning may serve to both conceal and implicate repressed or 
otherwise unacknowledged ideas. Imagining the law as a patient and its texts as the 
manifest content of a dream, the aim of analysis is to bring those concealed ideas 
eventually to the surface, to give themselves up as a train of thought leading back to 
an otherwise hidden source.14
Metonymy, however, not metaphor, is the trope of displacement. Metaphor is 
the trope of condensation. Gurnham mentions neither condensation (the image 
as more than itself ) nor sublimation (the translation of instinctual desires into 
higher aims), two of Freud’s essential concepts. Condensation involves a fusion 
of unconscious desires whereas displacement substitutes the socially acceptable 
for the socially unacceptable. As Freud points out, the manifest content of a 
dream or text has a smaller content than the latent dream or text. Condensation 
is brought about by fusing latent elements into a single composite image, an 
image with multiple meanings. Objectionable and unacceptable thoughts 
are thereby disguised. Graphic descriptions of sexual deviancy allow judges to 
combine disgust and desire at the same time, thereby fusing the reprehensible 
with the titillating and allowing us voyeuristic and perhaps vicarious pleasure in 
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid at 5.
13. Ibid at 15.
14. Ibid at 29.
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learning about all of the ways people may deviate from the heterosexual norm of 
reciprocal, affectionate sexual behaviour. Displacement replaces a latent element 
not by a component part of itself, but by something more remote. The plucking 
of bright yellow flowers may disguise and equal the fantasy of deflowering a 
young girl given to wearing yellow outfits.  
Such insights, however, can be arrived at by tropological analysis alone, and 
the question emerges as to whether the psychoanalytic machinery is necessary. 
What language is rhetorically doing on the figurative level can undermine and 
subvert what it is referentially saying on the literal level. The gap between the 
referential and the rhetorical, between what language literally says and what 
language figuratively does, is a commonplace of postmodern thought. In the 
depths of their imagery, writers cannot lie. Where there is eloquence, even of a 
prurient nature, there is emotional investment. As Gurnham reflects: 
[T]he legal process continually invites us to return to the scene of the crime. It is 
an invitation that is always taken up, consciously to condemn and assert distance 
between “us” and “them” but at the same time unconsciously and hypocritically to 
enjoy. It is, of course, only natural that we should feel resistant to the idea that our 
anger, disgust and revulsion at those who commit crimes may actually implicate 
us the “innocent” majority in the terrible behaviour of others. … [T]he chance to 
condemn criminally unrestrained sexuality actually carried out by others provides 
an opportunity for us the judging public to enjoy something of the sexual licence 
which is ordinarily kept repressed, without disrupting the integrity of our moral 
self-image.15 
No doubt the public gets off on lurid and sensationalist trials. Just as the 
alibi of science justifies reading Kinsey or Masters and Johnson, the alibi of law 
justifies reading a detailed description of Paul Bernardo’s sexual crimes. Nothing, 
however, is being repressed. And most self-styled connoisseurs of erotica know 
they are not reading their chosen magazines for the articles.
And that is my main reservation about this book. What is being repressed? 
Even if in The Merchant of Venice, when Bassiano is trying to persuade Portia to 
marry him, we see his choice of the lead casket over the gold and the silver casket 
as a metaphor for death transformed into an object of desire, a “desire to overturn 
death’s immutability,”16 the inference Gurnham draws from this transformation 
is questionable, namely,
that the uncanny return of that same wish to be able to control death may also 
be operational in statutes and legal judgments on HIV exposure and transmission, 
15. Ibid at 20-21 [emphasis in original].
16. Ibid at 7.
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which, by exaggerating the degree of control that an HIV seropositive person can 
have over the life of a complainant by failing to disclose his HIV status, construct 
the former as fulfilling that wish.17
Building on his identification of law as displacing and concealing unconscious 
impulses, Gurnham suggests “that the condemnation of the non-disclosing HIV 
lover symbolises the desire to have that kind of control over mortality, albeit 
disguised by reversal.”18
Gurnham identifies three misperceptions: that HIV is highly transmissible, 
that HIV is likely fatal, and that HIV is a matter of harm perpetrated on a victim, 
not a matter of mutual risk-taking. For him, criminal sanctions on a person who 
has unprotected sex and fails to disclose his or her HIV status make no sense: 
“[C]riminalisation … is better understood in terms of its unconscious cultural 
symbolism: as the expression of a collective wish to be able somehow to conquer 
death and bring it under human control.”19 This proposition seems implausible. 
Surely such criminalization reflects our desire not to get HIV from a reckless 
partner and our desire to punish and deter those who are indifferent to their 
partners’ health and safety. This is a desire to avoid preventable death, not a 
desire to conquer death. That the odds of infection are infinitesimal is not the 
point. Leaving aside whether Bassiano’s choice of the lead casket in The Merchant 
of Venice really represents “the fulfilment of a wish to defy the power of inevitable 
death by reshaping it as something desirable,”20 it is hard to see unprotected sex as 
desirable if its wages are possible infection or maybe even death. 
For Gurnham, the frightening or intolerable situation with respect to HIV 
“is not the infection or its consequences themselves, but rather the fear that 
something that we believe to be terrible may visit us when we are least equipped 
to defend ourselves, that is to say, in the abandon of sexual enjoyment.”21 That 
the latter fear is real seems indisputable, but it is hard to see our revulsion toward 
reckless fornicators as a “conscious condemnation of that which is unconsciously 
wished for.”22 Exactly what are we wishing for? The criminalization of reckless 
sexual behaviour does not target something that is merely symbolic; it targets 
actual deliberate conduct by an individual who really does pose a danger by 
failing to take steps to reduce risk.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid [emphasis in original].
19. Ibid at 50.
20. Ibid at 51 [emphasis in original].
21. Ibid at 53.
22. Ibid at 59.
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It is also difficult to see how “the criminalisation of HIV is in vain if we 
expect to find a convincing reason either in the usual aims of criminal justice 
(deterrence, incapacitation, etc) or in those of public health (the reduction in 
the spread of HIV).”23 Criminalization may not deter a prospective offender and, 
given the low probability of infection, it may not significantly reduce the spread 
of HIV—but it would certainly seem to incapacitate, denounce, and punish the 
particular offender. I agree that we must distinguish between “the actual choice 
made by the defendant (to have sex without disclosing one’s infection) and the 
‘choice’ as it is constructed in legal narrative (namely, to kill or seriously harm one’s 
partner).”24 I also agree that portraying the defendant as a callous homicidal person 
deliberately seeking to infect his or her victim and inflict grievous bodily harm is 
mistaken, as is failing to distinguish “an enduring myth of high transmissibility” 
and “the offence of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm.”25 But what we 
are talking about here is how to characterize a defendant and how to determine 
an appropriate penalty for an offence. True, as Gurnham points out, the failure 
to take necessary precautions is mutual. It is not merely a question of “cruel 
non-disclosers and passive innocent victims.”26 Nevertheless, it seems incredible 
to suggest that punishing a sex offender who exposes an underage sexual partner 
to HIV serves as “a useful vehicle for the reversal of an unconscious wish into 
condemnation.”27 What is the unconscious wish? Are we all repressed pedophiles? 
Are we all condemning what we ourselves secretly want to do? This does not 
make much sense to me. No doubt we are vicarious voyeurs condemning while 
at the same time indulging dangerous sexuality, but we are more or less conscious 
of what we are doing.
For the author, “a notion of ‘shared’ responsibility for HIV transmission 
is useful as a way of showing how law’s constructions of criminal responsibility 
assist in the fulfilment of an ancient unconscious wish … embedded deep within 
our culture”28—the impossible wish to master death and bring it under our 
control. That said, I really do not see how sending an infector to jail involves 
the impossible wish to master death and bring it under our control. Society 
may want to punish the infector—excessively and vindictively no doubt—but 
23. Ibid at 60.
24. Ibid at 61 [emphasis in original].
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.at 65.
27. Ibid at 65.
28. Ibid at 66.
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revenge, however ignoble and however irrelevant to what the law should be, is 
not an unconscious motive here. 
Nor is class an unconscious motive in Gurnham’s chapter, “‘Our Girls 
are [Not] Halal Meat!’” This chapter deals with metaphor and meaning in the 
reporting of sexual exploitation trials. The repressed eroticism of consumption, 
Gurnham argues, may return via food and sex metaphors.  The problem for 
me is where the repression resides. Such vulgar expressions as “eating pussy” or 
“sucking cock” make the connection between food, sex, and animality obvious. 
The literal and the metaphorical are both at play. Nevertheless, “[t]he chapter 
argues that the British media’s identification of ‘on-street’ sexual exploitation 
as a racial and/or cultural problem (i.e., of Asian males preying on white girls) 
may have served to displace and disguise something much more generally 
incriminating: that working class adolescent girls and young women are indeed 
‘meat’ (white or otherwise) for male consumption.”29 Gurnham “analyses the way 
that the mainstream British media understood the issue to be a racial or a cultural 
problem, namely about Asian men, mostly of Pakistani and Muslim backgrounds 
preying on vulnerable white female victims.”30 This focus displaces and represses 
another much more widespread and incriminating prejudice based on the girls’ 
own class identities: “[T]he ‘white meat’ of young girls feeds the sexual appetites 
of the judged criminals and judging public alike.”31
Again, an element of voyeuristic pleasure and vicarious pornography may 
come into play. But where is the repression? To say that “the (unconscious) 
sexualised class prejudice … underlies the (conscious) race discourse, the latter 
displacing and censoring the former”32 is to beggar belief. Just as our own 
authorities have been lax in their investigation of crimes involving sex workers 
or Aboriginal women, the British authorities, despite having copious evidence 
of harm at their disposal, waited months before acting simply because they did, 
at bottom, regard the working-class victims as white trash or white meat. The 
underlying misogynist assumption that some women are cheap and consumable 
meat, even if disguised or elided, is certainly not repressed. It is simply mistaken 
to say that “the overtly expressed worries about race and culture served to repress 
an arguably much more troubling and widespread set of class-based assumptions 
about sex and sexuality.”33 More troubling to me is the slogan, “Our girls are 
29. Ibid at 7-8.
30. Ibid at 71.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at 73.
33. Ibid at 91.
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not Halal Meat”—not, that is to say, food that is permissible for Muslims to eat 
under Islamic sharia law. Is this to say that the girls are haraam and therefore not 
fit to be eaten because unhygienic? If Halal meat is meant to be a metaphor, it 
does not parse in any obviously relevant or flattering way.
That the defence lawyers saw willful self-abasement on the part of the girls, 
that the authorities saw no crime and deemed exploitation to be tolerable, and 
that the girls themselves came to believe that they were rightly to be seen as 
objects of sexual ownership—these are the most troublesome aspects of the 
British sexual exploitation cases, and, as Gurnham cogently points out, they 
impinge upon our idea of sexual citizenship, an idea that in principle seems 
tolerantly egalitarian but is in practice coercively normative. “Fantasies such as 
sexual citizenship,” he writes, 
are necessary because they are the means by which we may reassure ourselves that 
the traumatic sexual violence that we learn about … is but an aberration of human 
sexuality rather than expressive of it. Their utility is to provide the “cover story” that 
spares us having to perceive the bruised corporeality of sexuality—raped, beaten and 
confined bodies—as too close or more generally incriminating.34 
For Gurnham, “criminal trials involving bodily violations are, indeed, 
merely iterations of some much deeper and primal traumatic event.”35 The aim 
of psychoanalysis is to inaugurate a return of the repressed, to plot “a route 
from current ‘iterations’ of trauma back to the so-called primal scene and its 
interpretation.”36
For me, the question is not whether we can profit by thinking about 
unconscious trauma and the primal scene. The question is whether these concepts 
have any pragmatic value when it comes to interpretation. If we can reach the 
same conclusions through rhetorical and narratological means, then the concept 
of the unconscious, in its psychoanalytic sense, is both empirically and critically 
dispensable. This is not to dispute the existence of unconscious intentions. Rather, 
it is to say that such intentions are best understood as implications of meaning—
implications generated by both what a text says on the referential or literal level 
and what it does on the rhetorical or figurative level. Implications are part of 
an intentional verbal act even if the utterer is unaware of them. The temporal 
character of both communicating and understanding makes unsurprising the fact 
that an utterer is sometimes unaware of the full implications of what he or she 
intended to communicate until some time later (if ever). It is almost as if there 
34. Ibid at 97.
35. Ibid at 98.
36. Ibid at 99.
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is a terminological compulsion in language that eludes the conscious control of 
the speaker or writer. There is what the language says and implies, which is not 
necessarily what the speaker or writer intends to say or imply. Our discourse 
generates implications that go well beyond our conscious intentions. What we 
want to say is often overshadowed by what our language says. In the depths of 
our imagery and figurative language, we reveal ourselves. Strange as it may seem, 
rhetorical language is a more reliable indicator of truth than referential language 
precisely because what language does rhetorically is often at odds with what it 
says referentially. Where a person is eloquent, there reside his or her deepest 
interests, values, and passions. When judges eloquently evoke what they morally 
revile, they convey a mixed message.
In Vicarious Kinks, Ummni Khan points out that judicial writing about 
pornography inevitably becomes “a form of vicarious pornography.”37 When 
judges write about deviant practices, they often create “a vicarious dynamic that 
reproduces the taboo sexuality.”38 Their anti-deviancy arguments sometimes 
manifest as what Khan calls “vicarious kink,” where the forbidden pleasures 
of abnormality are inadvertently reproduced in conjunction with vehement 
expressions of disgust. Pushing against what the judgment is saying referentially 
is a rhetorical undercurrent that reveals the deviant practice to be dangerously 
attractive. Khan notes:
While often being repressive and punitive, socio-legal discourses on s/m effectively 
proliferate pleasure as they traffic in the excitement and the incitement of new 
knowledges of sex. In other words, not only is knowledge power, knowledge is also 
pleasure. But this indulgence in the voyeuristic process of meaning-making still 
creates abject anxiety, which is often followed by a pronouncement of disgust and 
the expulsion of the sexual deviant from the social body.39
Khan, however, does not simply make conclusory statements. She shows, 
through patient rhetorical and narratological analysis, how judicial language and 
storytelling unconsciously embrace what they consciously condemn. She thereby 
uncovers the law’s unconscious without invoking psychoanalysis at all.    
Gurnham’s book ends with a critique of the criminalization of unconscious 
sex. In R v JA, as Khan explains, 
[t]he legal question of consent was particularly contested because the fact scenario 
involved a male partner who had been convicted of violent offences in the past, 
including domestic violence-related assault, and a complainant who gave conflicting 
37. Khan, supra note 6 at 12.
38. Ibid at 13.
39. Ibid at 305-06.
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accounts at the police station and in the courthouse. … At the heart of this 
controversial case was the issue of whether the s/m activities in question engaged 
the right to sexual autonomy, or the need to protect against sexual exploitation.40
With K.D.’s supposed consent, J.A. choked her until she passed out. She 
was unconscious for around three minutes and woke up to find a dildo in her 
anus, an object that was immediately removed upon her request. The parties then 
engaged in vaginal intercourse, after which K.D. uttered the safety word, and the 
ties that bound her were cut. Seven weeks later, with a custody battle for their 
son looming, she went to the police and said that she had not given her consent 
to what happened in the bedroom, and J.A. was charged with aggravated sexual 
assault. At trial, K.D. changed her story and said that everything that happened 
was consensual. The trial judge found J.A. guilty of sexual assault for the anal 
insertion—because one cannot legally consent to sexual activity that occurs while 
one is unconscious—but not guilty of aggravated sexual assault for choking his 
partner—because there was no bodily harm. Due to his prior convictions for 
drug trafficking, weapons, assault, and domestic assault (two of these assault 
convictions involving K.D.), J.A. was portrayed as an unsympathetic accused 
and publicly stigmatized as a sex offender.
The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the sexual assault conviction on the 
grounds that K.D. consented and that one can legally consent to sexual activity 
expected to occur while one is unconscious. Reversing the Court of Appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that one cannot legally consent to sexual 
activity that occurs while one is unconscious; consent must be contemporaneous, 
ongoing, and conscious.
Because of J.A.’s criminal record, especially his convictions for assault, and 
because of K.D.’s inconsistent statements that make her testimony seem as if it 
might be a product of battered spouse syndrome, R v JA is a hard case. According 
to Khan, J.A.’s guilt is premised on linking s/m with harm, degradation, danger, 
and exploitation.41 The judicial ruling ignores the s/m subcultural context and 
the possibility of edgeplay as an experience of desire, intimacy, trust, and sexual 
autonomy. The majority opinion of the Court insists that risk is one reason one 
cannot be allowed to consent to unconscious sexual activity.42 The judges, Khan 
suggests, do not understand the nature of risk let alone the nature of queer time. 
She goes on to say that 
40. Ibid at 252-53.
41. Ibid at 255.
42. Ibid at 258.
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[a] queer approach may find such risk irrelevant, or even exciting. For the submissive 
edgeplayer, time is queered, such that immediate physical sensation and the 
possibility of monitoring one’s partner is exchanged for the psychic satisfaction of 
imagining what will happen during future unconsciousness, and what did happen 
during past unconsciousness … . Some people may have a sexual bent that creates an 
entirely different relationship to risk and desire … . Wanting something dangerous 
despite or because of the lack of a guaranteed safety could be a valid version of an 
ethics of pleasure.43 
Risk-aware consensual kink is not part of the mainstream socio- 
legal imaginary.
The relationship between J.A. and K.D. has a history of what might be 
viewed as kinky s/m as well as a history of assault convictions. How then can 
we adjudicate between the conflicting scenarios of domestic violence and s/m 
practice? None of J.D.’s violent offences were sexual, yet he is portrayed as the 
abuser and she is portrayed as the victim. In alliance with what Elizabeth Bernstein 
calls “carceral feminism,”44 many judges address problems of alleged violence 
through punishments, especially incarceration. J.D. received an eighteen-month 
sentence, had a DNA sample taken, and was registered as a sex offender. The one 
thing not considered, Khan maintains, is male vulnerability and victimization 
within a decontextualized and neoliberal punishment scheme.
Whether or not one agrees with Khan’s characterization of the case, the 
carceral feminist approach she decries does entail that “any consent that women 
may give to submissive or risky sexual behaviour … can only be the product of 
‘larger systems of oppression.’”45 Gurnham follows Khan’s line of reasoning but 
gives the issue a Freudian spin:  
The ruling that a sexual act should be prohibited despite the consent of the 
“complainant” and the carceral feminist commentary that supports the Court’s 
view indicate that the dangers of sexuality are not to be regarded merely as personal 
violations of individual autonomy, but rather as a much more unspecific and opaque 
dread that in some important ways rehearses the rebellious political dimension of 
Freud’s anarchic primal murder.46 
That is to say, R v JA is about erotic asphyxiation and unconscious sex and 
is linked, first, with The Tempest, a play in which Caliban wants to overthrow 
43. Ibid at 262 [emphasis in original].
44. Elizabeth Bernstein, “Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The 
Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns” 
(2010) 36:1 Signs 45.
45. Ibid at 267.
46. Gurnham, Crime, Desire and Law’s Unconscious, supra note 1 at 109.
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his harsh and overbearing master and to sexually violate his master’s teenage 
daughter, and, second, with
Freud’s myth of the ‘primal horde’ of brothers who killed their tyrannical father 
in order to gain sexual access to all of the women of the tribe (their mothers and 
sisters), and the symbolic ‘return’ of the murdered father in the form of guilty self-
reproaches, taboo, morality and (finally) law that collectively prohibit repetition of 
that crime. … [It is a] myth of primal murder, incest, desire, and guilt.47 
According to Gurnham,
law seeks to isolate the sexual deviant as fundamentally different to ordinary people, 
and hence as abnormally susceptible to urges the latter would condemn. … [L]egal 
judgments appropriate the “victim” for laws cause by denying or marginalising her 
consent and thus the extent to which the prohibited sexual violence might already 
have been “sanctioned” as a private act.48
Gurnham sees “a fantasy of primal enjoyment as part of the law’s 
unconscious and an anxiety about sexually motivated crime as part of a deeper 
concern to suppress the ‘repetition’ of that primal episode of anarchic (sexually 
motivated) rebellion.”49
I quote Gurnham at length because whereas the general claim linking 
prohibited sexual violence to a fantasy of primal enjoyment seems plausible, 
the particular claim about primal anarchy and its repression seems unfounded. 
Is J.A. one of the primal horde of brothers who killed their tyrannical father 
in order to gain sexual access to all of the woman of the tribe? If so, who is 
the tyrannical father he killed in order to gain access to K.D.? If he is Caliban, 
who is the overbearing master he wishes to overthrow? The law? Vanilla sex? 
Hetero-normative compulsion? The Court says K.D. could not give consent. 
Carceral feminists say that she did not give consent, that what might be 
construed as a progressive attitude toward non-normative sexuality is just an 
alibi for the male exploitation and oppression of women, and that the supposed 
intimacy of heterosexual relationships is predicated on violence against women. 
Gurnham says the case has to do with the affective power of the primal scene: 
“[W]hile modern law draws attention to the conscious desire of certain perverted 
individuals to exploit others, it shields from view the dark heart of sexuality itself 
which embraces violation and unbounded enjoyment.”50
47. Ibid at 11.
48. Ibid at 110.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid at 114.
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Gurnham and Khan are right, I think, in their contention that kinky sex 
often involves the possibility of not knowing what one’s partner is going to do 
and that the very surrender of control is what creates excitement. As Gurnham 
notes, “In consenting to being reduced to the status of pure object for J.A.’s sexual 
enjoyment, K.D. effectively sanctions the rejection of sexuality as involving a 
mutual exchange between equal subjects.”51 They are also right in their contention 
that legal rhetoric and the judicial gaze often seek to repress the contagion of sexual 
transgression by pathologizing what is deemed to be perversion. “By emphasizing 
the victimhood of the person on whom the defendant acts,” Gurnham writes, 
“procriminalisation rhetoric undergirds the justifiability of the prohibition by 
denying or downplaying that victim’s sexual agency.”52 The alleged victim is seen 
to be incapable of giving valid consent. 
Of course, no one knows what really happened in the case of J.A. and K.D. 
No one knows whether they are sophisticated sexual adventurers penetrating the 
dark heart of sexuality so as to experience transgressive and unbounded jouissance 
or whether they are impoverished addicts acting out the all too familiar scenario 
of male abuser and battered woman. Both Gurnham and Khan may be a little 
optimistic in embracing the former, which is not to say that law should not 
recognize the legitimacy of s/m practices when the sex in question is consensual, 
mutual, and safe. Where valid consent and autonomous sexual agency exist, the 
law has no place in the bedrooms of the nation. But one can arrive at such a 
conclusion without invoking Caliban and the primal horde. And this is the major 
problem with this book. The literary examples and case histories illuminate each 
other but fail to connect with the legal analyses, analyses that would seem to 
require little more than the tools of rhetoric and narratology.
51. Ibid at 116 [emphasis in original].
52. Ibid at 122.

